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Introduction
Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation ("SLAPP") is a
recently identified genre of intimidation suit that menaces citizen activism. Though it presents itself as a common law tort claim, a
SLAPP's purpose and effect are extra-legal: the litigation intimidates
and diverts defendants, often entirely preventing them from advocating their views. A SLAPP defendant's right to advocate viewpoints
on matters of public concern can be rendered meaningless by a welltimed and well-orchestrated SLAPP.
In Part I, this Note surveys several aspects of the SLAPP phenomenon, including the various forms SLAPPs take, the problem with
SLAPPs, and factors to consider in finding solutions. Common defenses and deterrents, and reforms put forward to mitigate the harm
done by SLAPPs are insufficient. This Note proposes using 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 damages actions against SLAPP-plaintiffs' attorneys to deter
or punish their participation in SLAPPs.
Because section 1983 damages are only available against state actors, Part II analyzes the question whether and when attorneys are
state actors. An analysis of the United States Supreme Court's usage
of the title "officer of the court" frames the state action question. This
Part then proposes a model for applying the state action doctrine to
attorneys. The model explains the Supreme Court's application of the
state action doctrine to attorneys in three areas: when they act as defense counsel, when they use peremptory challenges, and when they
invoke pre-judgment remedies. Though attorney/state actors have
been denied qualified immunity from section 1983 actions, it should
be extended to their use of state procedures. Part II goes on to discuss
the section 1983 liability of SLAPP-plaintiffs' attorneys under the
state action model, concluding that in appropriate circumstances they
are state actors who may be liable.
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Part III discusses the advantages of the section 1983 countersuit
against SLAPP-plaintiffs' attorneys and runs through the elements of
that claim, including the possible state-of-mind requirement.

I.

SLAPP Suits

The SLAPP phenomenon first was identified by Penelope Canan
and George Pring at the University of Denver's Political Litigation
Project.' The increasing incidence of environmental advocates and

organizations being named as civil defendants prompted their study of

the issue.2 The Canan/Pring study developed a four-pronged definition for SLAPPs: "1. a civil claim for money damages, ... 2. filed
against nongovernmental individuals and organizations, ...3. based

on advocacy before a government branch or official or the electorate,
[and] ...4. on a substantive issue of some public or societal signifi-

cance." 3 Professor Pring has identified six legal claims most frequently alleged in SLAPP complaints: defamation, business torts,
conspiracy, abuse of process, interference with constitutional rights,
and nuisance. 4 Although SLAPPs are a common concern in the environmental area,5 the phenomenon may occur in a variety of circumstances,6 and the Canan/Pring definition
is arguably skewed to identify
7
only suits against environmentalists.

1. Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation:Mixing Quantitative and QualitativeApproaches, 22 LAw & Soc'y REv. 385
(1988).
2. Id. at 387.
3. Id. (footnotes and emphasis omitted). The fourth requirement is arguably too restrictive. One commentator has suggested that "[i]f the suit is intended to intimidate and
thus deny citizens their first amendment [sic] rights, the suit is a SLAPP." Victor J. Cosentino, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:An Analysis of the Solutions,27 CAL.
W. L. REv. 399, 401 (1991).
4. George W. Pring, "SLAPPs"--StrategicLawsuits Against Public Participation-A
New Ethical, Tactica; and ConstitutionalDilemma, C534 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 937, 941 (June 25,
1990).
5. See, e.g., Robert Abrams, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
(SLAPP), 7 PACE ENvT.
L. REv. 33 (1989); Richard 0. Brooks, Les Mains Sales: The
Ethical and PoliticalImplicationsof SLAPP Suits, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 61 (1989); Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 23
(1989); George W. Pring, SLAPPs: StrategicLawsuits Against Public Participation,7 PACE
ErTmL. L. REv. 3 (1989); Ralph M. Stein, SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the FirstAmendment, 7
PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 45 (1989).
6. For example, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), fits the Canan
Pring definition. In that case, a civil libel action was brought against four Alabama clergymen and a newspaper for an editorial advertisement which advocated a number of views
on southern racial politics and implicitly criticized Alabama's authorities. Id. at 256-58.
7. See Brooks, supra note 5, at 66; see generally Cosentino, supra note 3, at 400-01
(arguing that the Canan/Pring definition is too narrow).
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A recent California SLAPP illustrates the phenomenon. In the
early 1980s, the West Contra Costa Sanitary District proposed to solve
Contra Costa County's landfill shortage by constructing a waste-toenergy burn plant that would use garbage as fuel to burn sludge, converting it into energy.' Alan La Pointe opposed the idea. He and
others questioned the Sanitary District's financing of the plant and the
plant's environmental impact. 9 La Pointe's investigation into the
plant's financing prompted a grand jury investigation which concluded
that the Sanitary District had improperly used bond money from
other projects.1" Although the state attorney general's office declined
to prosecute, it noted that a2taxpayer's action would be appropriate. 1
La Pointe filed such a suit.'
The Sanitary District responded with a $42 million dollar crosscomplaint against La Pointe for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, conspiracy to interfere with economic relations, and indemnity. 3 The Sanitary District alleged, among other
things, that La Pointe had "solicited and succeeded in obtaining the
imposition of regulatory requirements" on the burn plant proposal;
"participated in at least two successive Grand Jury investigations";
"undermined the credibility of [the project's] consultants and experts"; and "attempted to undermine the credibility of the [Sanitary
District's] Board of Directors and its management.' 4 Sanitary District officials said they would identify 490 "Does,"' 5 and the suit was
filed one month before a major public hearing on the burn plant. 6
California Attorney General John Van de Kamp called the suit "a belligerent and unfounded attempt to strangle public debate."' 7 La
Pointe's advocacy before the government and electorate on an issue of
public significance made him the target of a suit for money damagesa SLAPP.
8. Todd Woody, SLAPP and SLAPP Back, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), Sept.
29, 1992, at 6.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. La Pointe v. West Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., No. 295995 (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra
Costa County filed Oct. 27, 1986).
13. Cross-Complaint for Damages, La Pointe v. West Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., No.
295995 (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra Costa County filed Feb. 26, 1988).
14. Id. at 7-8.
15. Woody, supra note 8, at 6. California allows plaintiffs to sue unknown defendants
under a fictitious name, usually "Doe." CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 474 (West 1979). Once
identified, defendants may be added to the action by proper notice. Id.
16. Sewer Agency Must Pay Richmond Man $205,100 Damagesfor Suit Against Environmentalist, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 1992, at D8 [hereinafter Sewer Agency].
17. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of the State of California in
Support of Demurrer to Cross-Complaint at 2, La Pointe v. West Contra Costa Sanitary
Dist., No. 295995 (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra Costa County filed Apr. 15, 1988).
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The La Pointe case will resurface throughout this Note to illustrate various points.
A.

The Problem with SLAPPs: Toward Finding a Solution

A unique problem with SLAPPs is that their success is not contingent on a victory in court. SLAPP plaintiffs seek to "circumvent [the]
political process by enlisting judicial power against their opponents.
They unilaterally transform the dispute topics (e.g., zoning becomes
libel) and move the forum of the dispute from the city hall to the
courtroom."""
Five advantages accrue to a SLAPP plaintiff the moment it files
suit.19 First, a SLAPP transforms the positions of the parties.20 In the
political forum, an active citizen can mobilize the electorate and media to scrutinize the incipient SLAPP-plaintiff's intentions and behavior, as well as the behavior of administrative bodies. By filing suit, a
SLAPP plaintiff moves the dispute to the courtroom, a forum isolated
from immediate political pressure, and shifts the focus onto the
SLAPP defendant's intentions and behavior.2 ' Second, the financial
risks faced by a politically active citizen increase.22 Before suit, a citizen can spend time and money proportionally to his or her interest in
public advocacy. Once a SLAPP is filed, the SLAPP defendant must
incur the costs of a legal defense. The SLAPP's claim for money damages may put a large portion of the SLAPP defendant's resources in
jeopardy. Third, defending a suit distracts the SLAPP defendant from
the political activity that elicited the complaint. 23 Fourth, filing a
SLAPP suit delays an issue's resolution long enough for public interest to wane. 24 Finally, a SLAPP can have a chilling effect on thirdparty political participation.25 Although SLAPPs have a low
probability of success,26 "[p]robability is not something most people
will rely on when told that they may lose everything they have. It is
much safer to be quiet."'27 The mere
filing of a SLAPP may have a
28
powerful effect on the legal laity.
18. Pring, supra note 4, at 943.
19. Cosentino, supra note 3, at 403-05.
20. Id. at 403.
21. Id
22. Id at 404.
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id. at 405.
27. Id
28. In J.S. Boswell Co. v. Family Farmers for Prop. 9, No. 179027 (Cal. Super. Ct. Kern
County July 8, 1988), a friend of the SLAPP defendants who had donated to their cause
thought he was a defendant in the suit "and labored under that misapprehension for the
four years prior to the suit's resolution." He testified, "'I had never been sued before. I
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In the La Pointe case, Alan La Pointe would later allege that
when the Sanitary District filed its suit against him, he was "concerned
over the possibility that he might become personally liable for a huge
judgment."29 He also "lacked the funds to defend himself in any protracted litigation."3 Other opponents of the bum plant "were intimidated by the threat that they soon might be named as Doe
defendants."'" The Sanitary District had taken the upper hand in the
political arena by filing its SLAPP against La Pointe.
In light of the effects of SLAPPs, Victor Cosentino has offered
five objectives for a solution to the SLAPP problem, as well as four
limitations. 2 First, a solution should protect defendants from the economic costs of their defense. Second, the "chilling effect" of SLAPPs
should be reduced or eliminated. Third, SLAPPs should be resolved
quickly. Fourth, attorneys should be discouraged from filing SLAPPs.
Fifth, the economic incentives to file SLAPPs should be eliminated.
Of the ideal solution, says Cosentino, "[t]rue success will be achieved
only when
the plaintiff refrains from filing the SLAPP in the first
33
place.

Cosentino's suggested limitations seek "to prevent the solution
from becoming as damaging as the problem it is trying to solve."34
First, a solution to the SLAPP problem must not be a reactionary response to SLAPP-like suits. 3 5 Because of the possibility that legiti-

mate suits may be mistakenly classified as SLAPPs, it must be
"expedient and quick, but must not trigger a judicial knee-jerk reaction."' 36 Second, it must overcome the dearth of facts available to a
court at the early stages of litigation in federal and other notice-pleading jurisdictions.3 7 Third, the solution must not protect actual tortious
behavior masking itself as petitioning activity.3 8 Fourth, the solution

must not deny potential or alleged SLAPP plaintiffs their rights, including due process. 9
thought I was being sued. I found out many years later I was not being sued, but for a long
time I was very upset about it."' Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPPI
SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law for PoliticalPurposesand a CountersuitResponse, 7
J.L. & POL. 417, 469 (1991).
29. First Amended Complaint for Damages at 8, La Pointe v. West Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., No. C-89 0710 DIU TSC (N.D. Cal. filed May 22, 1989).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Cosentino, supra note 3, at 407-12.
33. Id. at 411.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 412.
39. Id.
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Defending SLAPPs

There are three categories of defenses to SLAPPs. The first is
defending specifically on the merits of the particular claims. The spe-

cific defenses to common SLAPP theories are beyond the scope of
this Note.'
The second category of defense is premised on the constitutional

right to petition 4 ' as embodied in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The
doctrine has evolved from three antitrust cases 42 and "stands for the

proposition that parties undertaking legitimate petitioning of the government are immunized from any civil cause of action by a third party
injured by the petitioning activity."'43 The recent case of Columbia v.

Omni Outdoor Advertising" strengthened and broadened this doctrine. Professors Pring and Canan hail the case as setting "a clear,
new standard of maximum protection for Petition-Clause activity." 45
Omni holds in part that "a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose ' 46 is protected by the Petition
Clause. The only exception to this immunity is the "sham" exception
"in which persons use the governmental process-as opposed to the
outcome of that process-as [a] weapon. ' ' 7
The third category of defense is based upon state privileges. For
example, California provides a statutory privilege for communications
made during legislative or judicial proceedings.' This "potent privilege can block many different tort actions, such as defamation, abuse
of process and intentional interference with prospective economic ad40. For discussions of specific defenses to common SLAPP theories, see John C.
Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 Loy. L.A. L.
Rnv. 395, 420-25 (1993); Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A
New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 123-31 (1988).
41. "Congress shall make no law... abridging... the right of the people.., to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a historical discussion of the right to petition and comments on its modern application, see Julie M.
Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1993).
42. California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
43. Jeffrey A. Benson & Dwight H. Merriam, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs): An Overview, C750 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 837, 843 (Aug. 19, 1992).
44. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
45. George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, "SLAPPs"--"StrategicLawsuits Against
Public Participation"in Government-Diagnosisand Treatment of the Newest Civil Rights
Abuse, in 9 CrViL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEEs ANNUAL HANDBOOK 379,391
(Steven Saltzman & Barbara M. Wolvovitz eds., 1993).
46. 499 U.S. at 380 (quoting Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670).
47. Id. SLAPPs fall within this exception. Their filing is not immunized by the Petition Clause.
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(b) (West Supp. 1993).
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vantage. '49 It extends to communications with some connection to
any official proceeding, whether made in the proceeding or not.50
The West Virginia Supreme Court may have judicially crafted a
similar, but absolute, state constitutional privilege for petitioning activity in Webb v. Fury.5 1 Noting that the West Virginia constitution
warrants "giv[ing] even greater room for activities alleged to be protected by the right [to petition]," 52 the court referred to the defendant's communications to federal agencies as "absolutely privileged
petitioning activity. '5 3 While the conclusion that West Virginia grants
an absolute privilege to petitioning may be questionable, states can be
more solicitous of expressive rights under their own constitutions than
the federal constitution requires.54
In the burn plant example, Alan La Pointe demurred to the Sanitary District's cross-complaint on the ground that it was an "attempt
to thwart the exercise of constitutional rights by concerned citizens on
a matter of ongoing public concern ....

"1

The court sustained the

demurrer with leave to plead more specific facts regarding La Pointe's
wrongful conduct so the court could determine whether it was protected by the United States or California Constitution. 6 After the
Sanitary District failed to amend, its cross-complaint was dismissed. 7
Thus, for LaPointe, the constitutional defense proved effective.
C. Deterrents to SLAPPs
Common deterrents to SLAPPs include attorneys' fees awards,
sanctions imposed under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its state counterparts, attorney disciplinary proceedings, and
countersuits against SLAPP plaintiffs and their attorneys.5 8 Each has
significant limitations.
49. Barker, supra note 40, at 430.
50. See id. at 429-30.
51. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
52. Id. at 37 n.4.
53. Id. at 37. The defendant, Webb, had lodged an administrative complaint with the
Office of Surface Mining, Department of the Interior, and requested a hearing with the
United States Environmental Protection Agency. Id. at 31.
54. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding California free speech right preventing private shopping center from prohibiting handbill distribution consistent with federal constitution).
55. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer at 5, La Pointe v.
West Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., No. 295995 (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra Costa County filed
Apr. 4, 1988).
56. First Amended Complaint for Damages at 8-9, La Pointe v. West Contra Costa
Sanitary Dist., No. C-89 0710 DLI TSC (N.D. Cal. filed May 22, 1989).
57. Id. at 9.
58. See Brecher, supra note 40, at 131-32.
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1. Attorneys' Fees Awards
Attorneys' fees awards might cause SLAPP plaintiffs to consider
more carefully the legitimacy of their claims. Despite the American
Rule, which generally denies attorneys' fees to the prevailing party,5 9
attorneys' fees awards have recently become a more viable response
to SLAPPs-and a more likely deterrent.6" When the court dismissed
the Sanitary District's cross-complaint against La Pointe, it awarded
him $23,098 in attorneys' fees 61 under a California statute that authorizes such an award in an action "which has resulted in the enforce-

ment of an important right affecting the public interest." 62

Attorneys' fees awards may provide little economic deterrence,
however, when the cost to a SLAPP plaintiff of unchecked political
activity is greater than the potential award.6 3 A SLAPP plaintiff pursuing a large project may consider attorneys' fees awards just another
cost of doing business.
2. Rule 11 Sanctions

Sanctions against attorneys and their clients under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 64 and its state counterparts might
discourage SLAPPs in the same way as attorneys' fees awards. Because courts are reluctant to deter attorneys from pursuing available
remedies, however, Rule 11 sanctions are usually difficult to impose in
more than nominal amounts. 65 Like attorney's fees, Rule 11 sanctions
may provide scant economic deterrence unless they are awarded at

59. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
60. See Gordon v. Marrone, 573 N.Y.S.2d 105, 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). But see
Brecher, supra note 40, at 132-36 (discussing the difficulty of recovering fees under current
law).
61. Order Dismissing Cross-Complaint and Awarding Attorneys' Fees at 2, La Pointe
v. West Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., No. 295995 (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra Costa County filed
Sept. 7, 1988). La Pointe settled the Sanitary District's appeal of the attorneys' fees award.
62. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980).
63. Cosentino, supra note 3, at 416.
64. Rule 11 provides:
Every pleading, motion and other paper ...shall be signed by at least one attorney of record.... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by the signer that the signer has read the pleading... ; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry ...it
is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading... is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction....
FED.

R. Civ. P. 11.

65. Barker, supra note 40, at 417-19; Cosentino, supra note 3, at 417-18.
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levels commensurate to the profit a SLAPP plaintiff stands to realize
by thwarting political debate. 6
3. Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings
The threat of disciplinary proceedings under state rules of professional conduct does not deter attorneys from bringing SLAPPs for
three reasons. 67 The threat of a SLAPP is unlikely to prompt a citizen
complaint, much less a hearing. Also, a lay person is unlikely to complain if a suit is brought, as a legal novice is probably unable to distinguish a frivolous claim from a legitimate one. Finally, lawyers are
generally reluctant to inform on one another, 68 a situation accompanied by a general lack of enforcement by the bar.69
4. Countersuits
Probably the most effective deterrent to SLAPP plaintiffs and
their attorneys is the threat of a countersuit by the defendant. 70 Malicious prosecution, abuse of process, violation of state and federal constitutional rights, and state and federal civil rights statutes are typical
grounds for SLAPP countersuits. 7 1 This deterrent, however, also has
significant shortcomings. A countersuit further extends the unwanted
litigation for the SLAPP defendant. For example, one element of the
malicious prosecution cause of action, probably the most common
SLAPP countersuit theory, is a resolution of the case favorable to the
defendant.72 Therefore, suit on this theory cannot be brought until
there has been a judgment for the defendant.
A modest number of SLAPP countersuits have succeeded on civil
and constitutional fights theories, but the courts have denied them
precedential value by depublishing these cases. In Monia v. Parnas
66. Cosentino, supra note 3, at 417-18.
67. See id. at 418-20; Barker, supra note 40, at 416-17.
68. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1981)
("A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of [lawyer misconduct] shall report such
knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation.") with Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977,979-82 (1988) ("[W]hile
there has not been an extensive conspiracy of silence among lawyers, many lawyers in fact
are ...disinclined to report [fellow lawyers] to the disciplinary authorities.... While there
are lawyers who take seriously their ethical obligations to report the violations of other
lawyers, it is unusual to find the bar authorities enforcing this rule.") (footnotes omitted).
69. See Ann Marie, Competency and the Legal Profession:The CurrentReality of SelfRegulation under the ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 53 INS. CooNs. J. 72, 87
(1986); Rotunda, supra note 68 at 979-82.
70. Such countersuits are often called "SLAPP-Back" suits. See Pring, supranote 5, at
19; Woody, supra note 8, at 1.
71. Pring, supra note 5, at 20.
72. Brecher, supra note 40, at 126-27.
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Corp.,73 the California Supreme Court let stand a jury verdict of
$260,000 for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and interference
with constitutional rights, but decertified the appellate court opinion.74 In J.S. Boswell Co. v. Family Farmersfor Prop.9,75 a jury award

of $3 million in compensatory damages and $10.5 million in punitive
damages was upheld by a California appellate court in an unpublished
opinion.76
Alan La Pointe sued both the Sanitary District and its attorneys
for bringing their SLAPP against him.77 He sued the Sanitary District
alone under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violating his California constitutional rights. He sued both the Sanitary District and its attorneys for
conspiracy to violate section 1983 and for malicious prosecution. The
Sanitary District's attorneys settled with La Pointe for $225,00078 and
La Pointe won a verdict of $205,100 against the Sanitary District itself
after trial of the civil rights claim.7 9
D.

Legal Reforms Dealing with SLAPPs

Many scholars have advocated reforms to deal with the peculiar
problems of SLAPPs. 0 For instance, one commentator argues that a
malicious prosecution counterclaim should be allowed immediately,
instead of requiring a resolution of the case in favor of the SLAPP
defendant/counterclaimant. 81 This commentator also urges that attorneys' fees should be statutorily authorized where the defendant
"sought to advance the public's [interest], rather than his own... in
the underlying action."' Other reforms have been advanced or tested
in the courts and legislatures.

73. 278 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1991).
74. McMurry & Pierce, supra note 28, at 831.
75. No. 179027 (Cal. Super. Ct. Kern County July 8, 1988); see Robert I. McMurry &
David H. Pierce, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation(SLAPPs): The Benefits
and Risks, C750 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 823, 832 (Aug. 19, 1992).
76. Costantini & Nash, supra,note 28, at 417.
77. La Pointe v. West Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., No. C-89 0710 DLT TSC (N.D. Cal.
1989).
78. Letter from Margaret A. Corrigan of Rogers, Joseph, O'Donnell & Quinn, attorneys for Alan La Pointe, to author (Oct. 16, 1992) (on file with the Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly).
79. Sewer Agency, supra note 16 at D8.
80. See Pring, supra note 5, at 15-21.
81. Brecher, supra note 40, at 137-40.
82. Id. at 140.
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1. JudicialReforms
Several courts have recognized the SLAPP phenomenon. 83 Some
have taken steps to abate SLAPPs. In Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. (POME) v. District Court,' the Colorado Supreme Court
announced a rule raising the burden on SLAPP plaintiffs. When the
defendant in an alleged SLAPP action files a motion to dismiss asserting the constitutional right to petition, the plaintiff can only sustain
the action by showing that:
(1) the defendant's administrative or judicial claims were devoid of reasonable factual support, or if so supportable lacked
any cognizable basis in law for their assertion; (2) the primary
purpose of the defendant's petitioning activity was to harass the
plaintiff or to effectuate some other improper objective; and (3)
the defendant's petitioning activity had the capacity to adversely
affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.8"
A dissenting opinion proposed a similar rule in the West Virginia case
of Webb v. Fury.86 Justice Neely suggested that where conduct is
prima facie protected by the First Amendment, the court should require the plaintiff to make "more specific allegations than would
otherwise be required."' In addition, Justice Neely proposed an early
preliminary hearing, in which costs are advanced by the plaintiff and
the court awards attorney's fees to a defendant prevailing on the
merits.88
2. Legislative Reforms
Some legislatures have moved to reduce the harm of SLAPPs.
For example, California provides a special motion to strike for causes
of action "arising from any act of [a] person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue."'8 9 The statute
also provides for the recovery of attorney's fees and costs." In New
York, a "[p]ublic applicant or permittee" 91 plaintiff must demonstrate
that its suit for damages has "a substantial basis in law or is supported
by a substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
83. See, e.g., Westfield Partners v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524-25 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
("The court perceives this, with a great deal of alarm, as part of a growing trend of what
have come to be known as 'SLAPP suits."').
84. 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
85. Id. at 1369.
86. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
87. Id. at 47 (Neely, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West Supp. 1994).
90. Id. § 425.16(c).
91. N.Y. Civ. Ri-HTs LAw § 76-a(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
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existing law," 9 if it relates to "any efforts of the defendant to report
on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose such application or permission." 93 Otherwise, it will be dismissed. Both the California and
New York statutes increase the chance that SLAPPs will be dismissed
early and reduce the threats and costs to SLAPP defendants.
While state legislative and judicial reforms offer hope to SLAPP
defendants, other avenues to defend against and deter SLAPPs should
be pursued. Application of existing federal law could substantially de-

ter SLAPPs.
E. A Proposal: Attorney Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

A SLAPP countersuit theory holding SLAPP-plaintiffs' attorneys
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for initiating meritless suits that chill
defendants' First Amendment rights may be the solution. 94 Attorney
liability under section 1983 compares favorably to other SLAPP deterrents, 95 and it serves well Cosentino's objectives for a solution. 96 It is

particularly appropriate in light of attorneys' ethics and training,

which make them uniquely situated to avoid the costs of SLAPPs. 97

One problem with allowing SLAPP defendants to file section
1983 counterclaims is the possibility for abuse. 98 Some attorneys may
want to put this counterclaim theory into everyday use, even in response to legitimate suits. And qualified or good faith immunity,
which stops private suits against executive officials for constitutional
violations at the summary judgment stage, 99 is not currently available
to attorneys. 100 Thus, whether by statute or common law development, a section 1983 countersuit against attorneys must be limited to
instances in which there is probable cause that the original suit was
92. N.Y. Civ. PiAc. L. & R. 3211(g) (McKinney Supp. 1994).

93. N.Y. Cry.RIGHTS

LAW

§ 76-a(1)(a).

94. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people.., to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
95. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
98. The obvious public policy reason for the "favorable termination" element of the
malicious prosecution action is to keep countersuits to a minimum.
99. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1982).
100. See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992), discussed infra notes 194-220 and accompanying text.
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brought to chill the defendant's rights rather than to settle a legitimate
grievance. SLAPP counterclaimants should have to apply to the
courts for permission to pursue a section 1983 claim.' 01
A major limitation on using section 1983 against SLAPP-plaintiffs' attorneys is the requirement that their action be "under color of"
law.' 0 2 The United States Supreme Court interprets this requirement
identically to the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement. °3 "The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under [section] 1983 is the same question posed in cases
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement
of federal rights 'fairly attributable to the State?' "'4

H.

Applying the State Action Doctrine to Attorneys

The state action doctrine is "a conceptual disaster area."" °5 Unfortunately, this Note does not relieve that problem. Instead, this Part
begins by discussing state action theory. Then it examines the historical meaning of the attorney's title, "officer of the court," which frames
the state action issue. Next, this Part proposes a model that harmonizes the Supreme Court cases dealing with the attorney-as-state-actor
question and addresses the availability of qualified immunity to attorney/state actors. Finally, using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
a framework, this Part discusses the state-actor status of SLAPPplaintiffs' attorneys.
A.

The State Action Doctrine

A seminal declaration of the state action doctrine appears in Ex
parte Virginia.'06 There the Court declared:
101. Requiring parties to petition the court before bringing an action, while not common, is not unprecedented. See, e.g., Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905, 912 (S.D.
Tex. 1986) (further actions by pro se litigant to be reviewed by court before summons
issues).
Allowing defendants to petition for a malicious prosecution counterclaim, rather than
requiring a prior "favorable termination," could improve that cause of action as a deterrent
to frivolous claims also.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
103. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).
104. Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,937 (1982), discussed infra
notes 184-93 and accompanying text.)
105. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term Forward: "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California'sProposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); see
Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 587, 588 (1991) ("[N]early every article about the state action doctrine published in the last twenty years quotes and concurs with Professor Charles Black's characterization .... ").
106. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
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[T]he prohibitions of the 14th Amendment are addressed to the
States .... They have reference to actions of the political body
denominated a State, by whatever instruments or in whatever
modes action may be taken. A State acts by its legislative, its
executive, or its judicial authorities.... The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of
the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny
to any erson within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.107
In Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles,10 8 the
Court extended the doctrine, holding that actions unauthorized by the
state remain state action if taken under the guise of state authority:
"[W]here an officer or other representative of a State in the exercise
of the authority with which he is clothed misuses the power possessed
to do a wrong forbidden by the [Fourteenth] Amendment, inquiry
concerning whether the state has authorized the wrong is
irrelevant.... ,109
The state action requirement assures that the Constitution governs government, not private individuals.
[T]he Constitution controls the deployment of governmental
power and defines the rules for how such power may be structured and applied. The Constitution, therefore, is not a body of
rules about ordinary private actions, but a collection ° of rules
about the rules and uses of law: in a word, metalaw."
Phrased differently, the state action requirement controls the reach of
constitutional protections. Where courts find state action, constitutional rights are implicated. Thus, the doctrine assures that the Fourteenth Amendment "protects the individual from arbitrary
governmental interference.""' Where state action is not found, constitutional rights are not implicated. Here the doctrine "prevents federal courts from using the [Fourteenth] Amendment to govern directly
the actions of individuals."" 2 This "preserves the federalist structure
of governmental power and maintains the separation of power among
the branches of the federal government.""' 3
Common practical approaches to the state action doctrine provide little guidance in determining whether attorneys are state actors.
Professor Tribe gives coherence to the state action requirement
through a two-lens approach-first focusing on "the actual partici107. Id. at 346-47.
108. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
109. Id. at 287. This is the "abuse of authority" doctrine.
110. LAUREN cE H. TRmIE, CONsTrrtunoNAL CHoicEs 246 (1985).
111. William M. Burke & David J. Reber, State Action, CongressionalPower and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the FourteenthAmendment, 46 S. CAL. L. Rtv. 1003, 1012 (1973).
112. Strickland, supra note 105, at 595.

113. Id.
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pants in a controversy and examin[ing] the Constitution's application
to the individuals and organizations who act as the state's agents,"
then "look[ing] beyond the human figures... to examine the substantive law."11 4 More often, however, courts and commentators attempt
to define discrete categories of cases where state action can be
found.1 15 In hard cases, the categories can be as deceptive as they are
helpful." 6 Attorneys do not fall neatly into, or out of, any category.
B.

The Attorney as an "Officer of the Court"

Lawyers and judges often use the term "officer of the court" to
make a point about the role or responsibilities of attorneys. Unfortunately, "many have little more than a vague idea of its meaning or of
the responsibilities that follow from that status."" 7 The meaning of
the phrase has varied from one circumstance to another and lacks independent legal significance. This discussion of the title "officer of
the court" only frames the question of whether or not an attorney is a
state actor. Because the attorney's function varies, an attorney's par-

ticular role in a given case should determine state actor status.
Historically, the title "officer of the court" derived from the distinction in England between solicitors and barristers. 1 8 It became
part of the Supreme Court's lexicon in Ex parte Garland.1 9 The Gar114. TMBE, supra note 110, at 248.
115. See, e.g., Strickland, supra note 105. Professor Strickland posits six theories of
state action: overt conduct of state employees, officers, and agencies; the creation and enforcement of substantive civil law; state inaction-the denial of judicial relief or other state
intervention; governmentally regulated private conduct as state action; joint participation
with state officials as state action; and assumption of state powers-the government function theory of state action. Id. at 596-633; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
937, 939 (1982) ("[T]he Court has articulated a number of different factors or tests in different contexts: e.g., the 'public function' test.... the 'state compulsion' test....
the 'nexus'
test .... and.., a 'joint action test.... ."') (citations omitted).
116. See, e.g., Jenner v. Shepherd, 665 F. Supp. 714, 720-21 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (weighing
whether police officer's presence during "final altercation" between landlord and tenant
created state action under "public function" theory in landlord's detention of property for
nonpayment of rent).
117. Nathaniel E. Gozansky & Consuelo L. Kertz, Private Lawyers' Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 24 EMORY L.J. 959, 959 (1975).
118. See People v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 490 (N.Y. 1928). While barristers were regulated by the Inns of Court, solicitors or attorneys were officers of the court by virtue of
their regulation by the courts themselves. Robert J. Martineau, The Attorney as an Officer
of the Court: Time to Take the Gown Off the Bar, 35 S.C. L. REv. 541, 544 ("TWo explanations of the English attorney's special title were commonly accepted. One explanation was
that an attorney was subject to court regulation because he was an officer of the court. The
other was that an attorney was an officer of the court because he was subject to its regulation."). This, of course, reveals little about an attorney's historical rights and duties.
119. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). The issue in the case was whether a post-Civil War
Congress could constitutionally require an oath of Civil War-era allegiance for admission
to practice before the courts of the United States. Id. at 374-76. Requiring such an oath, if
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land Court's holding turned on whether an attorney was an officer of
the United States and it wrote:
The profession of an attorney ... is not like an office created by
an act of Congress, which depends for its continuance, its powers, and its emoluments upon the will of its creator, and the possession of which may be burdened with any conditions not
prohibited by the Constitution. Attorneys ... are not elected or
appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution ....
They are officers of the court, admitted ... upon evidence of
their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private
20
character.

To contest the Garlandmajority's view, Justice Miller, leading a
four-judge dissent, quoted the Judiciary Act of 1789121 and pointed
out that "[t]he right to practise law in the courts as a profession, is a
privilege granted by the law, under such limitations... as the lawmaking power may prescribe."'"a Attorneys, Justice Miller wrote,
"are as essential to the successful working of the courts, as the clerks,
sheriffs, and marshals, and perhaps as the judges themselves, since no
instance is known of a court of law without a bar."'" The title "officer of the court" has made its way into modern cases in the mold cast
by Garland. The Supreme Court has often been divided about the
meaning of the term in relation to the role of attoreys)2

operating to exclude individuals from a profession, would constitute an unconstitutional ex
post facto punishment, but it could constitutionally be required of officers of the United
States. The Court held the oath requirement unconstitutional as to Garland, whose ties to
the Confederacy had been pardoned by the president. Id. at 375.
120. Id. at 378.
121. "[I]n all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their
causes personally; or by the assistance of such counsel or attorneys-at-law as, by the rules
of the said courts respectively, shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1654
(1988)).
122. Garland,71 U.S. at 384 (Miller, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Martineau, supra note 118, at 551-52 n.31.
125. For example, the Court held in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), that Connecticut's exclusion of aliens from the practice of law violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
at 729. The Court conceded that the state's statutory scheme made "every lawyer a 'commissioner of the Superior Court' .... [with] authority to 'sign writs and subpoenas, take
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and acknowledgements [sic] of
deeds' "-with the assistance of a county sheriff or a town constable. Id. at 723 (quoting
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-85) (West 1985)). Citing Garland,however, the Court held
that lawyers were "not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers." Id. at 729.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the majority's view
of attorneys. He wrote:
I am unwilling to accept what seems to me a denigration of the posture and
role of a lawyer as an "officer of the court." . . . By virtue of his admission a
lawyer is granted what can fairly be called a monopoly of sorts; he is granted a
license to appear and try cases; he can cause witnesses to drop their private affairs
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"Officer of the court" is invoked regularly in matters of admission to the bar and in'disciplinary proceedings. 1 26 The primary use of
the title has been "in defining the obligations of individual attor-

neys."'127 Thus, although "officer of the court" has been denied independent legal significance, it is regularly used to support the

heightened responsibility of attorneys.'2
and be called for depositions ...; the enormous power of cross-examination of
witnesses is granted exclusively to lawyers.... In most States a lawyer is authorized to issue subpoenas commanding the presence of persons and even the production of documents . . . . The broad monopoly granted to lawyers is the
authority to practice a profession and by virtue of that to do things other citizens
may not lawfully do.... The lawyer's obligations as an officer of the court permit
the court to call on the lawyer to perform duties which no court could order citizens generally to do, including the obligation to observe codes of ethical conduct
not binding on the public generally.
The concept of a lawyer as an officer of the court and hence part of the
official mechanism of justice in the sense of other court officers, including the
judge, albeit with different duties, is not unique in our system but it is a significant
feature of the lawyer's role in the common law.
Id. at 730-31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). His appeal referred not only to the profession's
reputation, but to the attorney's role in fact, in history, and (on a slightly different point) in
comparison to other legal systems. Id. at 730-33.
126. Gozansky & Kertz, supra note 117, at 960-62 ("Such language traditionally has
been used to support regulations governing the admission to practice and to serve as standard 'boiler plate' in all opinions dealing with disbarment or some lesser disciplining of
lawyers."). In Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957), the Court refused to disbar an
attorney from the federal courts because of his disbarment from the courts of Louisiana.
"The two judicial systems of courts," it said, "have autonomous control over the conduct of
their officers, among whom, in the present context, lawyers are included." Id. at 281; accord In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985). The Court cited approvingly from People v.
Culkin, 162 N.E. 487 (N.Y. 1928), in which Judge Cardozo wrote, "Membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions. The appellant was received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an officer of the court, and, like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." Id. at 489 (citations omitted).
127. Martineau, supra note 118, at 558. Professor Martineau posits nine categories of
duty in which "officer of the court" is invoked. They are: duty to provide services to the
court, duty to obey the law, duty to preserve professional integrity, duty to preserve the
integrity and dignity of the legal system, duty to promote fair administration of justice,
duty to be truthful, duty to know the law, duty to inform the court of the law and the facts,
and duty to inform the client. Id. at 559-70.
128. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where the Scottsboro defendants' convictions were overturned for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court wrote, "Attorneys
are officers of the court, and are bound to render service when required by such an appointment." Id. at 73. In United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 978 (1966), the Ninth Circuit held that court-ordered representation, like that
recommended in Powell, does not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. Id. at 636. This
holding is inconsistent with the Court's dicta in Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399
(1956), which viewed attorneys as independent businesspeople, and under which the taking
of attorneys' labor without compensation would be unconstitutional. See Cammer, 350
U.S. at 405. Ignoring Garland's four-judge dissent, the Cammer Court wrote:
[N]othing that was said in Ex parte Garlandor in any other case decided by this
Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks or
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The uneven history of the title "officer of the court" suggests the
unique and intricate relationship attorneys have to the justice system.
Given this relationship, an attorney's rights and liabilities should not
be defined a priori by attorney status, but rather by analyzing the nature of the attorney's involvement in each particular case.
In most cases, the only logic stated is that because an attorney is
an officer of the court ipso facto a certain result follows. This
reasoning... substitut[es] a label for an analysis. Courts should
analyze the role of the attorney in terms of the function of the
attorney in the legal system, and determine whether the result
purportedly dictated by the label is necessary
129 or appropriate for
the proper functioning of the legal system.
The next Parts attempt such an analysis.
C. Attorneys as State Actors

This Part begins by setting forth a model for determining when
attorneys are state actors. It then surveys areas where the Supreme
Court has or has not held attorneys to be state actors. The variety of
roles attorneys play has led to divergent results in different cases. The
model explains these results.
1. When Attorneys Are State Actors
Attorneys litigate within the framework of procedural rules.
Within this framework, courts and legislatures leave discretion to the
attorney: what procedure to invoke, when to invoke the procedure,
upon whom to invoke the procedure, on what factual predicate or
legal theory to invoke the procedure-the list varies with each circumstance. Imposing narrower procedural rules would increase certain
costs and burdens on the judiciary. The state avoids these costs by
delegating numerous decisions to attorneys, who are well-suited to
make them. But the state's constitutional responsibilities do not vanish. They are delegated as well.

3

Attorneys become state actors

when they use state procedures against adverse parties.
An example illustrates this idea. Procedural rules let an attorney
choose against whom to file suit. The state could require the attorney
to submit for ex parte approval a proposed defendants list that injudges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important though it may be to our system of justice. In general he makes his own
decisions, follows his own best judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own
business.
Id.
129. Martineau, supra note 118, at 541.
130. See infra text accompanying note 160.
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cludes constitutional rationales for naming each defendant.13 ' But the
courts and legislatures have delegated these decisions to attorneys.
By allowing discretion into procedural rules, the state grants decisional power to attorneys. These grants of discretion substitute the
attorney's decisions for those of a judge or other state officer or body.
To the extent an attorney uses state procedures against an adverse party (i.e., to the party's legal detriment' 32 ), the United States
Supreme Court has held the attorney a state actor. Where the attorney's use of procedure violates the adverse party's civil rights, the
Court has found the attorney/state actor culpable or liable 33 or found
34
the procedural rule an unconstitutionally broad grant of discretion.
Where it has chosen both, attorneys have unfortunately been
threatened with liability for good faith use of presumably constitutional procedures.'35 Where the Court has chosen neither, the attorney has been using procedural discretion against
a non-adverse party,
36
and thus not to the party's legal detriment.
This model applies equally to lay litigants. Indeed, under the
model, a teenager contesting a parking ticket may be a state actor.
This apparent expansion of state action would be shocking, but the
procedure does not enable the teenager to violate the civil rights of
any adverse party. 37 It does not matter that the teen is a state actor.
Intuitive rejection of the notion that a party can so easily become a
state actor may be misplaced disapproval of liberal grants of state
power to presumptively private parties. The proper objection is
against procedures that put rights-abridging state power in "private"
hands.
131. In Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1986), the court required
further actions by a pro se litigant to be reviewed before a summons would issue. Id. at
912. "While this procedure may not save the Court's resources, it will, hopefully, protect
innocent defendants while at the same time preserving Plaintiff's right of access to the
courts." Id This balance is commonly struck by attorneys-at a savings to the judicial
system.
132. As used in this discussion, "legal detriment" means "peril vis a vis the state" or
"liability recognized and enforceable by the state."
133. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991), discussed
infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text; Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357
(1992), discussed infra notes 154-69.
134. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969), discussed
infra notes 172-83 and accompanying text; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982), discussed infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1992), discussed infra notes 194-220
and accompanying text; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, discussed infra notes 184-193.
136. See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981), discussed infra notes
140-45 and accompanying text.
137. The adverse party in this example is a government, which does not have civil
rights.
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This discussion singles out attorneys because they regularly invoke state power and because finding that an attorney is a state actor
is more likely to be meaningful.138 Singling out attorneys is also more
accurate: where the following discussions suggest that the Court has
found attorneys to be state actors, the Court has generally referred to
the litigant as the state actor. 139 The fiction the Court engages-that
an attorney is a mere agent of the litigant-suspends reality and disserves both the state action analysis and attorney accountability.
More objectionable than this model's apparent extension of state action to private parties, in these cases private parties were identified as
state actors, though their attorneys properly should have been.
a. Defense Counsel
In Polk County v. Dodson,"4 a public defender was alleged to
have violated her client's civil rights by providing inadequate representation because she withdrew from his case.14 ' The Court sweepingly held that "a public defender does not act under color of state law
when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding."' 42 The Court rejected the court of
appeals' construction of the complaint, which read the plaintiff's allegation of having been injured by counsel "acting pursuant to administrative rules and procedures for ... handling criminal appeals," to
state a valid section 1983 action. 4 3 The public defender had withdrawn pursuant to a procedural rule,'" but the Court found no "pol138. Because non-attorneys presumably lack explicit knowledge of constitutional rights,
much of the rationale for extending § 1983 liability to them is absent, and they are likely
beneficiaries of a good faith defense. Hence, this Note does not advocate § 1983 liability
for non-attorneys. A non-attorney who invokes a procedure capably knowing of or intending to violate constitutional rights, however, probably should be liable.
139. In some of the cases, it must be presumed that an action was brought, or a procedure used, by an attorney, rather than in propria persona. But see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 71-72 (1972) (husband of an appellant, who was familiar with ex parte application
procedure, replevied wife's child's property).
140. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
141. Id. at 314-15.
142. Id. at 325. But see Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356-57 (1992), discussed
infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text (finding that defense counsel's use of peremptory challenges, a traditional function of defense counsel, was state action).
143. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 326.
144. Rule 104(a) of the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure states:
If counsel appointed to represent a convicted indigent defendant in an appeal to
the supreme court is convinced after conscientious investigation of the entire record ... that the appeal is frivolous and that he cannot, in good conscience, proceed with the appeal, he may move the supreme court in writing to withdraw.
IOWA

R. APP. P. 104(a).
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icy" effectuated by a rule or procedure that allegedly violated the
client's rights. 145
Dodson shows the adversity element of the state action model.
Although her withdrawal may have disadvantaged her client, it did
not further the client's legal detriment. Discontinuing representation
of her client was not a use of procedure against an adverse party.
Only a use of state procedure against an adverse party can be state
action.
b. The Peremptory Challenge
Peremptory challenges allow an attorney to strike a certain
number of potential jurors virtually without cause. This procedure allows attorneys to shape juries advantageously for their clients and disadvantageously for their clients' opponents. In both the civil and
criminal contexts, the Court has found that the peremptory challenge
constitutes an exercise of state action.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete,4 6 the Court found a private
civil litigant's use of peremptory challenges to be state action. 147
Thus, if the opposing party could make a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination by the challenger, the court would require a race-neutral explanation of the challenge. 48 The Court found peremptory
challenges to be a privilege having its source in state authority. 49 Peremptory challenges "are permitted only when the government, by
statute or decisional law, deems it appropriate .... ,150 Examining in
detail "the extent to which the [litigant] relied on governmental assistance and benefits,... whether the [litigant was] performing a traditional governmental function,.., and whether the injury caused [was]
aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority," the Court found the use of peremptory challenges to be state
action.15 '
145. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 326.
146. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
147. Id. at 2083.
148. Id. at 2081; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986) (holding that prima
facie showing of racial peremptory challenges requires prosecutor to explain challenges on
race-neutral grounds).
149. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
150. Id. This satisfied the first part of a two-part test from Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922 (1982), discussed infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text. The Lugar test as
recited in Edmonson is "first whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from
the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority, and second, whether
the private party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state
actor." Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-83 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 2083 (citations omitted). Perhaps unsure of the implications of its holding,
the Court left several bases on which to distinguish later cases, including the fact that peremptory challenges "occur within the courthouse itself." Id. at 2087.
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The peremptory challenge is a grant of procedural discretion to
attorneys subject only to the limitation that it not be used in a racebiased fashion. By invoking this privilege, whether motivated by
"sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices"' 52 or by race bias,
an attorney seeks a legal advantage over the adverse party. Thus, a
peremptory challenge is state action as to that party. The Edmonson
Court could have found that the peremptory challenge is too broad a
grant of discretion because of its potential racist use. Implicitly affirming that the peremptory challenge is a constitutional procedure,
however, the Court remanded so the lower court could determine
whether the attorney was a culpable state actor in using it.'5 3 Whether
the defense could proffer a race-neutral explanation for its challenges
would determine its culpability.
In Georgia v. McCollum,'5 4 the Court extended Edmonson's
holding to the criminal defense context. 5 The Court held that a
criminal defendant's peremptory challenge makes use of "'governmental assistance and benefits' that are equivalent to those found in
the civil context in Edmonson. 'By enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, [a] Court... elect[s] to place its power, property
and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination."' 56 Peremptory
challenges, even by a criminal defendant, "perform a traditional function of the government" in selecting an impartial trier of fact.5 7 This,
in turn, "'insur[es] continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people."" 5 8 The fact that trial by jury is constitutionally compelled in the
criminal context reinforced the Court's finding of state action.'5 9 The
Court observed that "[t]he State cannot avoid its constitutional responsibilities by delegating a public function to private parties." 6 ' It
distinguished Polk County v. Dodson, 6 ' writing that "the determination whether a public defender is a state actor for a particular purpose
depends on the nature and context of the function he is performJustice O'Connor's dissent dissected and rejected the bases on which the majority
rested its decision. Id. at 2089-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "The peremptory is," Justice
O'Connor wrote, "an enclave of private action in a government-managed proceeding." Id.
at 2090.
152. Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations and quotations
omitted).
153. Id at 2089.
154. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
155. Id. at 2358.
156. Id. at 2355 (quoting Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2084) (alterations in original; internal
quotation marks omitted).
157. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2355.
158. Id. (quoting Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2083).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2355-56.
161. 454 U.S. 312 (1981), discussed supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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ing.' ' 1 62 Lastly, the Court observed that state action will be found
"even though the motive underlying the exercise of the peremptory
challenge may be to protect a private interest.""1 6
Justice O'Connor dissented, finding it remarkable "that criminal
defendants being prosecuted by the State act on behalf of their adversary when they exercise peremptory challenges .... 164 She argued
that Dodson's logic was evaded by the Court's holding, in which "defendants and their lawyers transmogrify from government adversaries
into state actors when they exercise a peremptory challenge, and then
change back to perform other defense functions."' 65 Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas concurred out of deference to the holding in Edmonson, 6 6 while Justice Scalia derided what he called following that decision "logically to its illogical conclusion." 6 7
By using the peremptory adversely to the state, 68 McCollum's
counsel did, in fact, "transmogrify" into a state actor. Implicitly finding the grant of discretion to bring peremptory challenges constitutional, the Court remanded for a determination whether McCollum's
counsel could offer a race-neutral explanation. 6 9
c.

Prejudgment Remedies

The Court has most thoroughly developed state action doctrine
as it applies to attorneys in the area of prejudgment remedies. To
protect creditors, states may allow summary prejudgment attachment
and garnishment procedures, but these procedures can impinge putative debtors' due process rights. When a prejudgment remedy has violated a debtor's rights, the Court has held the attorney to be a state
actor in order to reach the conclusion that the statute authorizing the
attachment is unconstitutional. 7 ° Analytically, though, the attorney's
use of prejudgment remedies is always state action, which only gets
noticed by the courts when that use violates constitutional rights.17 '
162. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2356. But see supra text accompanying note 142.
163. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2356-57.
164. Id. at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 2362.
166. Id. at 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. The Court gave the state standing as a third party to contest McCollum's challenges. Id. at 2357 ("As the representative of all its citizens, the State is the logical and
proper party to assert the invasion of the constitutional rights of the excluded jurors in a
criminal trial.").
169. Id. at 2359.
170. If there were no state actor, there would be no constitutional claim.
171. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), is a landmark case that demands mention. In Flagg Brothers, an owner of stored goods alleged in a § 1983 action
that a warehouseman's proposed sale of the goods under New York Uniform Commercial
Code § 7-210 would violate her civil rights. Id. at 153. The Court found neither "depriva-
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Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.17 2 concerned a Wisconsin garnishment statute that gave plaintiffs ten days in which to serve a complaint on defendants after serving the garnishee. 173 The statute
allowed a creditor to request a summons of the court clerk and set in
motion "the machinery whereby the wages are frozen" by serving the
garnishee. 174 Only a victory on the merits in the main suit would unfreeze the wages. 7 5 Granting that "[s]uch summary procedure may
well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations," the Court held that no such situation presented itself in Sniadach, "nor [was] the Wisconsin
statute narrowly drawn to meet any
1' 76
such unusual condition.'
The Court's holding rests on the insufficiency of notice as a violation of due process, 177 but deals at length with the effects of garnishing
a wage earner's pay.178 This suggests that the Court was concerned
with garnishment as a whole and that mere pre-garnishment notice
may not have garnered the Court's approval. Justice Harlan's concurrence bolsters this view: "I think that due process is afforded only by
the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the
validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying
claim...
'1 79
before [the defendant] can be deprived of his property.'
The plaintiff's attorney in Sniadach, by invoking Wisconsin's garnishment statute adversely to Sniadach, was a state actor. 80 The statute gave attorneys almost unlimited discretion to garnish a putative
debtor's wages and the attorney's use of the statute violated Sniadach's rights. Since the only limits18 on an attorney's choice to exertion of any right 'secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States," id. at 156,
nor state action. Id. at 157. This is actually not a prejudgment remedy case because the
statute did not countenance a legal proceeding. The statute permits an exercise of self-help
under the substantive law. The New York statute laid out a complicated "procedure"
under which a warehouseman's lien could be enforced, but following the procedure could
not operate to the property owner's legal detriment unless and until compliance was at
issue in a legal proceeding. Thus, the statute did not create a state procedure, use of which
would be state action.
172. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
173. I& at 338.
174. Id. at 338-39.
175. Id. at 339.
176. Id.
177. Id.at 342.
178. "A prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type is a taking which may impose
tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support." Id. at 340. "The leverage
of the creditor on the wage earner is enormous." Id. at 341.
179. Id.at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring).
180. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 927 (1982) (holding that state
action was an implicit predicate of Sniadach's application of due process standards).
181. The threat of a common law abuse of process action may hem in attorneys' discretion to garnish wages, but, given garnishees' minimal assets, such a threat is remote.
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cise the procedure were the inconvenience of requesting a summons
of the clerk, serving the garnishee, and serving a complaint on the
defendant within ten days of this service, the Court found the rule an
unconstitutional grant of discretion.
The observation that garnishment may be appropriate in "extraordinary situations"'1 82 suggests that attorney discretion to garnish
wages should be curtailed to where such a circumstance could be alleged.'8 3 A narrower garnishment statute would not prevent the attorney using it from being a state actor. It would reduce the chance
that the attorney could violate a debtor's civil rights.

In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,'" the Court held that a claim
stated a section 1983 cause of action because it alleged that the de-

fendant-creditor's use of Virginia's attachment procedure violated the
plaintiff's civil rights.' 85 The district and appellate courts had not resolved whether Lugar alleged that his civil rights were violated under
the Virginia statute or under the respondent's erroneous application
of the statute against him,'8 6 but "resolution of this issue [was] essential to the proper disposition of the case."'

87

The Court held that

"[p]etitioner did present a valid cause of action under [section] 1983
insofar as he challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia statute;

he did not insofar as he alleged misuse or abuse of the statute."' 88

The language of the opinion suggests that only an attack on the

statute will withstand summary judgment.

89

Whether or not an attor-

182. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339.
183. Modem statutes require such allegations. In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982), discussed infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text, the attachment statute
required an allegation of "belief that petitioner was disposing of or might dispose of his
property in order to defeat his creditors." Id. at 924.
184. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
185. Id. at 942.
186. Id. at 940.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 942. Where Lugar alleged that deprivation occurred from "respondents'
'malicious, wanton, willful, opressive [sic], [and] unlawful act-,"' the Court took that to
mean "'unlawful under state law"' and not a manifestation of state action. Id, at 940. This
was not a deviation from the "abuse of authority" doctrine, see supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text, because if "respondents invoked the statute without the grounds to do
so [it] could in no way be attributed to a state rule or state decision." Lugar, 457 U.S. at
940. Where the Court was able to read it as a "challenge [to] the state statute as procedurally defective under the Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 941, the complaint stated a cause
of action. Lugar's first count implicated the Virginia statute for allowing issuance of a levy
without posting of a bond, without establishing a factual basis for resorting to attachment,
and without a sufficiently prompt hearing to release the assets. See Joint Appendix at 4-5,
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1987) (No. 80-1730) (allegations six, seven, and
nine). This count stated a cause of action.
189. "Petitioner did present a valid cause of action ... insofar as he challenged the
constitutionality of the Virginia statute." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942. Compare this to Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991), discussed supra notes 146-53 and accom-

Winter 19941

ATI'ORNEYS AS STATE ACTORS

ney is a state actor appears to hinge on the fortuity of the statute's
constitutionality. This probably motivated the dissenting Justices.
Chief Justice Burger objected that "[r]espondents did no more than
invoke a presumptively valid.., procedure available to all."'190 He
protested the possibility that innocent use of a procedural framework
"transforms [one's] acts into actions of the State."' 191 Echoing Justice
Burger, Justice Powell called the decision an "example of how expansive judicial decisionmaking can ensnare a person who had every reason to believe he was acting in strict accordance with law."'19
The state action model's refinement of the Lugar court's analysis
clears up the problem that motivated the dissenters. Lugar alleged
that the statute's broad grant of discretionary power to Edmondson's
attorneys was unconstitutional. Whether it was or not, Edmondson's
attorneys were state actors when using it against him. Lugar's allegation that his rights were violated by their choices under the procedural
rules stated a cause of action. The liability of Edmonson would turn
on whether they were entitled to qualified immunity or could establish
a good faith defense, 9 3 a strong likelihood given the statute's presumptive validity.
2. Should Attorney/State Actors Have Qualified Immunity? Wyatt v.
Cole
Wyatt v. Cole' 94 rounds out this Part's survey of cases concerning
attorneys as state actors. Its facts effectively mirror Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,' 95 but Wyatt examines the availability of qualified
or good faith immunity for the attorney/state actor.
Cole used a Mississippi replevin statute against Wyatt.'96 Cole's
refusal to comply with a post-seizure order to return the property elicited Wyatt's suit.' 97 The district court, assuming Cole's liability under
section 1983 for use of the replevin statute, held him entitled to qualified immunity from suit "for conduct arising prior to the statute's invalidation."'9 The Supreme Court reversed. 99
panying text, and Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992), discussed supra notes 15469 and accompanying text, where the constitutionality of the peremptory challenge was
assumed, but allegations of race-biased use stated a cause of action.
190. Id. at 943 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 944 (Powell, J., dissenting).
193. See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992), discussed infra notes 194-220 and accompanying text.
194. 112 S.Ct. 1827 (1992).
195. 457 U.S. 922 (1982), discussed supra notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
196. Wyatt, 112 S.Ct. at 1829.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1831.
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The opinion discussed two circumstances in which an immunity
from section 1983 has been recognized. First, if at the time of section
1983's enactment, "the tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in
the common law and was supported by such strong policy reasons that
Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish
the doctrine";2° ° and, second, where there are "special policy concerns
involved" 2 01 as there were in Harlow v. Fitzgeraldz °2 which extended
qualified immunity to government officials required to exercise
discretion. 203
Cole did not and, according to the Court, could not argue that
there was a historical immunity, because "such protection did not extend to complaining witnesses who.., set the wheels of government
in motion by instigating a legal action."'2 1 Cole argued that "at common law, private defendants could defeat [the analogous torts of] malicious prosecution or abuse of process.., if they acted without malice
and with probable cause. ' 205 But these defenses,2 06 wrote the Court,
"would still not entitle them to the qualified immunity from suit accorded government officials .... 2207
As to "special policy concerns," the Court distinguished Harlow
as an anomaly that "completely reformulated qualified immunity
along principles not at all embodied in the common law. ' 20 Justified
by "the attendant harms to governmental effectiveness caused by
lengthy judicial inquiry, ' 20 9 Harlow qualified immunity was limited to
parties holding office "requiringthem to exercise discretion... [and]
principally concerned with enhancing the public good. 210
The Court carefully narrowed its holding in Wyatt, writing that
"[tihe precise issue encompassed ... is whether qualified immunity...
is available for private defendants faced with [section] 1983 liability
for invoking a state replevin, garnishment or attachment statute."21 '
200. Id. (quotations omitted).
201. Id. at 1833.
202. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
203. Id. at 813-15.
204. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1831.
205. Ld.
at 1832.
206. As Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out, "[d]escribing the common law as providing a 'defense' is something of a misnomer." In context, "defense" is a "useful shorthand
for capturing plaintiff's burden and the related notion that a defendant could avoid liability
by establishing either a lack of malice or the presence of probable cause." Id. at 1838 n.1
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1832 (majority opinion; emphasis added).
208. Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1833 (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 1834.
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Furthermore, the Court was careful not to foreclose the availability of
the defenses argued by Cole in support of immunity.212
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that public policy warrants extending immunity to private defendants because "society will
be benefitted if private parties rely on the law to provide them a remedy, rather than turning to some form of private, and perhaps lawless,
relief."21 3 Calling the decision a "needlessly fastidious adherence to
nomenclature,"2" 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that, because
probable cause is a question of law to be decided on summary judgment, denying the earlier relief of qualified immunity "will only manage to increase litigation costs needlessly for hapless defendants."2 5
Justice Kennedy's concurrence supported this adherence to nomenclature, pointing out that, "[b]y casting the rule as an immunity,
we imply the underlying conduct was unlawful, a most debatable
proposition in a case where a private citizen may have acted in goodfaith reliance upon a statute. 2 1 6 Extended back to Harlow, however,
this view implies that government officials' unlawful conduct is immunized, a most unseemly proposition itself.
Contrary to the holding in Wyatt, the attorney/state actor should
have the same qualified immunity as state officials. The absence of
such immunity, however, is not a profound threat to attorneys whose
practice area already makes them adept litigators. Two observations
place Wyatt's rejection of qualified immunity for private section 1983
defendants in perspective.
On one hand, this Note's state action model is less palatable if
qualified immunity is not available to private defendants. Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation is apt:
[I]t is at least passing strange to conclude that private individuals are acting 'under color of law' because they invoke a state
garnishment statute and the aid of state officers.., but yet deny
them the immunity to which those same state officers are entitled, simply because the "private" parties are not state
employees.
The rule that section 1983 immunity can exist only if it was available at
the time of the statute's passage is aptly criticized by one commentator, who asks: "If the common law is to be the guiding light, should
not the law of [section] 1983 at least be able to benefit from the genius
of the common law system, the abilities to evolve to meet changing
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1839 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
1838.
1839.
1836 (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
1840 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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conditions and to learn from the foibles of the past?"2 ' Important
policies like those that supported Harlow's extension of immunity exist where parties resort to the court system. For example, the courts'
traditionally restrictive approach to attorney liability has been justified by the policy that "it is socially more useful to provide broad encouragement to prospective litigants to resort to court with real or
imagined grievances rather than hedge access with requirements of
good faith."2' 19 Wyatt should be reversed or limited to its facts. Ex-

tending qualified immunity to attorneys who use procedural discretion
in good faith, instead of requiring them to make the same showing
later on summary judgment, would reduce the perceived danger of the
model's apparent expansion of attorney liability.
On the other hand, denying attorneys qualified immunity is not a
radical leap into protracted professional liability litigation. Absent
immunity, a section 1983 action against attorneys should be allowed
only after a showing of probable cause. 2 0 It would be no great burden to require attorneys-litigators, in particular, who invoke procedures against adverse parties-to withstand a summary judgment
motion on their own good faith or probable cause. Harlow's protection of certain government officers from the perils of litigation does
not necessarily have to extend to those whose professional calling is
courting those very perils. Society would benefit, despite an increase
in attorney liability litigation, from the decrease in rights-infringing
intimidation suits.
C. SLAPP-Plaintiffs' Attorneys as State Actors Liable Under Section
1983
This Part returns to the problem of SLAPPs, exploring how
SLAPP-plaintiffs' attorneys should be liable for civil rights infringement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A simple complaint under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is a framework for discussing plaintiffs' attorneys' use of procedure as state action. Then, some elements of a
successful SLAPP are added to the batter. The complaint is, of
course, the first in a long series of filings that require adverse parties
to respond on pain of monetary or other loss.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give attorneys carte
blanche to file suit.22 ' Upon filing, the clerk issues and delivers a sum218. Martin A. Schwartz, Private Defendants Are Denied Qualified Immunity, N.Y. L.
J., July 21, 1992, at 3.
219. CHARLEs W. WOLPRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs 233 (1986).
220. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
221. "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." FED. R. CIV. P.
3. Rule 11 and other disincentives to frivolous litigation come into play after the defendant
has been served and has hired an attorney-and well after a SLAPP has achieved most of
its purpose.
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mons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, who is responsible for
service of the summons and a copy of the complaint. 2' By writing or
symbol, the summons holds out in four places the authority of the
court or the federal rules. On this authority, the summons threatens
default judgment.2"
The rules grant attorneys discretion on when to file, against
whom to file, in what jurisdiction, on what factual bases, on what legal
theories, for what amount-the list is truly endless. These grants of
discretion lessen societal costs by reducing the number of decisions
that must be made by the formal elements of the justice system:
judges, magistrates, clerks, and the like. Each grant of discretion replaces a judge's or other state officer's determination with that of an
attorney trained and obliged to use that discretion properly. 224 Filing
suit is a procedure used adversely to, and to the legal detriment of, the
222.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 4. A formbook appears as follows:
SUMMONS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Civil Action, File Number
A. B., Plaintiff
v.
C. D., Defendant

Summons

To the above-named Defendant:
You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon
, plaintiffs attorney, whose address is
, an answer to the complaint which is
herewith served upon you, within 20 days after service
of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be
taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
Clerk of the Court.
[Seal of the U.S. District Court]
Dated
(This summons is issued pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
(As amended Dec. 29, 1948, eft. Oct. 20, 1949.)
219 (1993) (reprinted with permission, Copyright © 1993 by West Pub. Co.).
223. WEST PUBLISHING Co., supra note 222, at 219. One of the rationales for the state
action finding in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991), discussed supra
notes 146-53 and accompanying text, and Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992),
discussed supra notes 154-69 and accompanying text, was the state's apparent imprimatur
on the peremptory challenge. The state's imprimatur on a complaint is factually distinguishable, of course, but only in ways not meaningful to legal laypeople.
224. See infra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
WEST PUBLISHING Co., FEDERAL CIVL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES
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defendant. The summons issued based on a filing carries with it state
compulsion and state power.
A SLAPP-plaintiff's attorney can manipulate the discretions
available within this procedure to suppress the speech and political
activity of his or her client's opponents. Filing a frivolous claim
against legal laypeople based on their participation in constitutionally
protected speech activity is an example. An attorney who uses his or
her power in this way is a state actor who has deprived persons of
their First Amendment rights, and who should be liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
HI. Liability of SLAPP-Plaintiffs' Attorneys Under
Section 1983
This Part discusses the advantages over other deterrents of using
section 1983 against SLAPP-plaintiffs' attorneys. Ideally suited as
they are to prevent the filing of frivolous suits, attorneys are appropriate objects of liability when they do not. Finally, this part discusses
the possibility that the Sanitary District's attorneys inthe La Pointe
case could have been liable under section 1983.
A.

Section 1983 Liability Compared to Other SLAPP Deterrents

As a deterrent, section 1983 liability compares favorably to, or
enhances, other deterrents. Section 1983 damages are less determinate and predictable than attorney's fees awards. The indeterminacy
of a potential damage award should discourage SLAPP plaintiffs and
their attorneys from incorporating legal fees and damages
into the
225
calculus of a project they are trying to push through.
Section 1983 damages have the dual advantages over Rule 11
sanctions of (1) providing a discrete harm to be recompensed, and (2)
supporting an award that incorporates the significance of constitutional violations. Where Rule 11 sanctions punish for pleadings "interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,"

6

a

section 1983 action fully develops the constitutional harm done to the
SLAPP defendant and elicits corresponding damages.
The section 1983 action shares a disadvantage with other countersuit theories: the litigation is extended for the countersuing SLAPP
defendant. A section 1983 countersuit, however, does not require a
favorable outcome for the defendant in the main suit before it can be
225. See supra text accompanying note 63.
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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brought, a distinct advantage over the malicious prosecution
counterclaim.227
Section 1983 damages enhance the prospect of successfully pursuing a SLAPP countersuit. The possibility of a substantial recovery
should motivate attorneys to pursue SLAPP countersuits on a contingency fee structure, which is ideally suited for the SLAPP defendant
wary of litigation expenses. Furthermore, attorneys' fees and expert
fees are recoverable in a section 1983 action. 2 This gives section
1983 another distinct advantage over malicious prosecution and other
common law theories, where attorneys' fees come out of the damage
recovery.
Ideally, section 1983 liability would deter altogether the filing of
SLAPPs, achieving the best solution to the SLAPP problem. This
would completely protect defendants and third parties from the costs
and chilling effects of SLAPPs, without depriving plaintiffs of due
process.
B. Attorneys as the Most Efficient Cost Avoiders
The costs of frivolous claims to defendants and society are manifest. An early study indicated that the average SLAPP defendant was
engaged in the litigation for an average of thirty-two months,229 a figure from which one can presume substantial legal fees and expenses.
During 1985, the average value of defendants' time and expenses (exclusive of legal fees and expenses) in tort cases generally was estimated to be between $6,125 and $6,467.23 0 The most important costs
of SLAPPs, however, are intangible: the loss to citizens of their free
and active participation in the political process, and the loss to society
in citizen activism and participation.
A countersuit theory for section 1983 damages utilizes the ability
of attorneys to distinguish meritorious claims from non-meritorious
ones. Given attorneys' ethical standards and training, they can and
should be responsible for filtering out frivolous and rights-menacing
suits. The American Bar Association has stated that "[a]s a member
of a profession that bears special responsibilities for the quality of justice," a lawyer should be committed to the value of promoting justice,
fairness, and morality.231 This includes "counseling clients to take
[these] considerations ...

into account when the client makes deci-

227. See supra text accompanying note 72.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)-(c) (Supp. Im 1991).
229. Canan & Pring, supra note 1, at 389.
230. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN
TORT LITIGATION 61 (1986).
231. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDuCATIoN AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 140
(1992). This statement disavows enumerating "ingredients that are either necessary or suf-
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sions or engages in conductthat may have an adverse effect on other
individuals or on society." 2 Under these standards, "[e]ffective
counseling requires... [a]ttempting to persuade the client to modify
his or her decisions or actions to accommodate the[se] interests...
and... [t]aking action to safeguard the interests of third parties or the
general public; or ... [w]ithdrawing from representation of the client."' z1 3 Attorneys should be held to know of, consider, and counsel
their clients regarding the constitutional rights of adverse parties. Because attorneys are aware of constitutional rights, and because they
are ethically obligated to promote justice and fairness, they should be
responsible for distinguishing valid causes of action from frivolous
ones. They alone can prevent costly frivolous suits from ever being
filed.
Requiring attorneys to use their discretion is the most efficient
way to avoid both the monetary and First Amendment costs of
SLAPPs. In the parlance of the law and economics movement, attorneys are the most efficient cost-avoiders of frivolous litigation. When
attorneys use the state's dispute resolution mechanism to stifle free
speech and to gain political advantage for their clients, they should be
held liable under section 1983.
C.

Possible Liability of the Sanitary District's Attorneys in La Pointe
v. West Contra Costa Sanitary District

Though the theory was not tested in the La Pointe case, the Sanitary District's lawyers may have been accountable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for bringing the Sanitary District's SLAPP. The clear elements
of a section 1983 claim are (1) a violation of a federally protected
right, (2) by a state actor. 34 Though section 1983 has never been
found to contain a state-of-mind requirement, 235 and its language does
not suggest one,23 6 there probably would be a requirement of at least
knowing or reckless action in the context of a SLAPP countersuit. 3 7
The verdict in La Pointe's suit against the Sanitary District establishes that his First Amendment rights were violated. The second eleficient to avoid malpractice," id. at 132, but describes ethical standards to which the bar
should be held.
232. Id. at 213.
233. Id. at 176-77.
234. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
235. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534 (1981).
236. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (section 1983's criminal
counterpart, which provides: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any [person] to the deprivation of any rights .... " (emphasis added)); see Parrat,451 U.S. at 534-35.
237. See Parrat,451 U.S. at 547-49 (Powell, J., concurring); Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d
404, 407 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding that where "state official's judgment and discretion are of
vital concern," at least knowledge or recklessness must be alleged).
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ment is established if one accepts this Note's theory that attorneys are
state actors when using procedure adversely to their clients' opponents. Several facts from the La Pointe case suggest that the Sanitary
District's attorneys may have been reckless, or worse, in bringing the
SLAPP.
The Sanitary District's countersuit alleged La Pointe to have
taken acts that fall clearly within well-established constitutional protections. One of the Sanitary District's defense strategies in La
Pointe's section 1983 suit was to point out its reliance on advice of
counsel. "'The board initially discussed whether this is protected constitutional speech' its defense counsel said in opening argument, 'and
the lawyer said, No, this went over the line, you can bring a lawsuit.'"8 If the Sanitary District actually asked its attorneys whether
La Pointe's speech was constitutionally protected and received such a
reply, this raises a strong inference that the attorneys were at least
reckless. Handwritten notes produced by the Sanitary District's attorneys to La Pointe suggest that the attorneys thought better of some
allegations, but left them in the cross-claim at the behest of the Sanitary District. 3 9 This raises an equally damning inference-that the
attorneys filed the suit knowing of its potential harm to First Amendment rights.
The timing of the SLAPP, one month before a major hearing on
the burn plant,24° could suggest either knowledge or intention241 that
the suit would discourage public opposition. This inference would be
especially strong if the statute of limitations on the SLAPP's causes of
action extended any great length beyond the time of the hearing.
Finally, the use of "Doe" defendants z' may raise inferences
about the Sanitary District's attorneys' state of mind. A newspaper
article appearing the day after the Sanitary District's attorneys filed
the counterclaim included the following: "The countersuit ...

takes

aim at up to 500 unidentified people who the district contends have
conspired with La Pointe. The district plans to begin identifying those
'
persons within the month, [a Sanitary District attorney] said."243
If
the attorneys used "Does" to allow or enhance the intimidating power
238. Woody, supra note 8, at 1 (internal quotations omitted).
239. The notes read as follows: "Meeting w/PI [Public Information] committee at [illegible] re x/c [cross-complaint] & press release. [Board member], [board member], [District's
outside publicist], [attorney]. Recommend removal of "politically & philosophically" opposed language from x/c & press release. [District's outside publicist] disagrees, as does PI
[committee]. Leave as-is, file & serve." Handwritten notes of Sanitary District attorney
(Feb. 24, 1988) (on file with the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterly).
240. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
241. The timing alone of a SLAPP would not raise an inference of recklessness.
242. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
243. Michael Hytha, WestSan Files Countersuitin Energy-plant Plan Case, W. CouNTY
TIMEs (Contra Costa County), Feb. 27, 1988, at 2A.
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of the Sanitary District's public announcement of the suit, this would
support an inference of knowledge or intention.
These facts, and others not developed during discovery or trial,
may have been sufficient to show that the Sanitary District's attorneys
had the state of mind requisite to liability under section 1983 for infringing Alan La Pointe's First Amendment rights.
Conclusion
The SLAPP genre of intimidation suit is particularly harmful because of its effects on active citizen discussion of public issues. The
defenses to SLAPPs provide tardy reassurance to SLAPP defendants,
and the deterrents that exist in attorney's fees awards, Rule 11 sanctions, and attorney disciplinary proceedings are insufficient. A solution to the problem should protect defendants from the legal costs of
SLAPPs, eliminate their "chilling effects," resolve them quickly, discourage attorneys from filing them, and eliminate the economic incentives to file them, but not be reactionary.
Adding damages awards against attorneys for violating 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 would provide an additional deterrent and an arrow in the
SLAPP defendant's countersuit quiver. Section 1983 compares favorably to other countersuit theories and it exploits the fact that attorneys are the most efficient cost avoiders for frivolous suits.
The state action doctrine should not be a hurdle to holding attorneys liable under section 1983. The Supreme Court's cases in the areas of defense counsel, peremptory challenges, and prejudgment
remedies show that attorneys are state actors as to adverse parties
against whom they use state procedures. When an attorney's manipulation of procedural discretion violates the adverse party's civil rights,
the attorney should be held liable under section 1983. Though an attorney/state actor should have qualified immunity, after Wyatt such an
attorney must establish a good faith defense, such as probable cause,
which may be decided at the summary judgment stage. To the end of
protecting free and active citizenship, this price is not extraordinary.

